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Response to A New Definition of Tolerance:
On Philosophical and Practical Challenges
Jamie M. Hansen, Ph.D.
Brigham Young University

I

n a political (and academic) climate which seems
to equate tolerance with radical acceptance, I
commend Williams & Jackson (this issue) for their
well-reasoned presentation of an alternative definition which, in my view, preserves its function in our
language and society. The author’s new definition of
tolerance balances both the complexities and beauties
of human diversity without sacrificing substance or
philosophical rigor. The authors aptly and succinctly
introduce readers to an interpretation of Levinas’ philosophy that is rich with implications for the field of
psychology generally and the practice of psychotherapy in particular grounded on the notion of “respecting
and considering the humanity of a person as more important than any idea or ideal we or they may hold.”
While I found myself largely in agreement with many
of the ideas and implications of their main argument,
I was also left with questions and concerns regarding
implementation. I outline a number of these questions
in response to the authors’ own invitation for feedback
and dialogue “about the philosophical and practical
challenges” their new definition of tolerance poses.

a true idea, but an idea it remains and so is subject
to some of the same challenges and “underlying problems” of the original definitions of tolerance Williams
& Jackson seek to replace. Although not insurmountable, these problems are worth identifying and considering in the hopes of turning a good idea into sustainable and meaningful action. Using the framework of
“philosophical and practical challenges” the authors
invited comment on, I will identify and expound upon
mostly practical challenges, but first a mention of one
philosophical question that I suspect has an answer
somewhere else in the writings of Levinas but about
which I am unaware.
A Philosophical Question
“Tolerance, in Levinasian terms, would focus on accepting and respecting the person, and being responsible to
them without being concerned about the beliefs they hold
or the activities in which they are engaged.”

The idea of engaging tolerance at the interpersonal
level in the way the authors propose is an intriguing
and compelling prospect. On the surface however, the
above statement could be taken to mean that a person’s beliefs and behaviors are irrelevant and without
moral consequence. And perhaps in some sense they
are irrelevant. They may be irrelevant in discussions
of tolerance and engagement with diverse others. In

The main thrust of my reaction and resulting commentary is that a new definition of tolerance based
on valuing the humanity of others more than ideas is
itself an idea. It may be a good idea, it may even be
7

volume 37

issues in religion and psychotherapy

fact, given the new definition, beliefs and behaviors are
likely to fall under the category of that which commits
“totalizing violence” by reducing the infinite nature of
the other to a mere object. However, beliefs, behaviors and the ways in which we engage them are central
to matters of meaning and morality in life. The philosophical question then is what are the moral implications of this new definition of tolerance? I think it
would be premature and short-sighted to say that it
leads inevitably to moral relativism. I also think that
on the face of it, not being concerned about the beliefs
and activities of the others in our lives is a slippery
slope headed in that general direction. Again I qualify
this ‘philosophical question’ as I have called it with my
sense that the philosophy of Levinas—which as the
authors point out communicates an understanding
of existence as “primarily ethical”—will also provide a
context and grounding sufficient for this question of
moral implications.

our clients walk into our offices and engage in therapy,
they do so within this cultural context (Gantt & Burton, 2013). In that way, a focus on self and responsibility to the self are not only valued and emphasized
but far too commonly are their default mode of being
in the world-an implicit undercurrent. Not only are
many of our clients coming from cultures of individualism, they are also often conceptualized in our discipline as being motivated primarily by self-interest and
hedonistic desires-a context which poses certain challenges for a Christian (or in this case, “other-based”)
therapy (Gantt, 2003). I fear that often therapy is
more about encouraging self-indulgence (using other words and techniques that preach acceptance and
self-compassion) than cultivating responsibility to the
other. In much the same way that values have been
found to be inescapable in psychotherapy (Strupp,
1980; Slife, Smith, & Burchfield, 2003), and clients
tend to adopt the values of their therapists over time
(Tjeltvelt, 1986 and Beutler, 1979), both therapists
and clients are susceptible to the influence of society
and the cultural values it imparts. But not only are we
and our clients influenced by the individualism of our
culture in some meaningful ways, so also are the aims
of the psychotherapeutic endeavor itself.
While the approaches and aims of therapy are many
and varied, almost universally the self is a defining
feature or focus. Whether the goal is that of self-actualization, self-fulfillment, or self-awareness, all psychotherapies of which I am aware are directed toward
self-improvement of one kind or another. Many therapeutic approaches draw on strategies of self-soothing,
emphasize self-care, and at every turn ask clients to
consider what would be in their best self-interest. All
of this “self-ness” of therapy may not inherently be antithetical to the new definition of tolerance proposed
by Williams & Jackson, but it appears to be in the least
inimical to it. That is, it poses a practical challenge in
terms of implementation. There may indeed be “no escape” from the choice “to either ignore or accept the
call to be responsible for the other,” as the authors
claim, but there certainly is distraction from this fundamental call to the other. And, as the authors also
allude to, the modern western world has become quite
skilled at providing incentives and ample opportunity
for self-indulgence.
I want to be clear that I am not saying self-care and

Practical Challenges
“. . . Levinas’ view of the world seems to be in stark contrast with most of western civilization . . . Trying to reverse
course on such a firmly planted individualistic ideal may
prove to be an unrealistic goal.”

In their concluding remarks, the authors alluded to
the practical challenges involved in implementing a
definition of tolerance which in many ways is countercultural both in terms of the individualism of western
civilization as they framed it and I would add the individualism inherent in many mainstream conceptions
of psychotherapy. As I read the new definition of tolerance, my thoughts quickly turned to the context of
therapy and the challenges of implementing a perspective which elevates the importance of responsibility to
the other in a medium which at the outset is by definition focused on the individual. These challenges, in
my mind, fall under two main umbrellas, one having
to do with the culture in which we live and the other
having to do with the professional nature and ethics of
psychotherapy.
A culture of individualism and indulgence.

It seems to go without saying that modern life, at least
in the western world, is steeped in individualism. In an
overly simplified sense, what this means is that when
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self-awareness are bad strategies for therapy. I am
saying, however, that they create a context which may
prove difficult to enact a definition of tolerance which
depends upon ‘other-care’ and ‘other-awareness.’ It
seems that in both theorizing and psychological research, a Levinasian-based understanding of tolerance is much smoother to implement and endorse,
but in the practice of psychotherapy, one must be
prepared to go against the grain, so to speak ,which
will require overcoming certain obstacles-mainly of a
sociocultural making.

the therapist in ways that cross the boundaries of ethical therapist-client relationships, such would prove
difficult given the professional nature of the discipline.
Much like the challenge of individualism, I do not see
this as an impenetrable barrier. I do see it as an area
around which we need to be careful and intentional
about how the new definition plays out.
I conclude by again commending Williams & Jackson for introducing a new definition of tolerance which
truly does make progressive strides in resolving problematic issues inherent in prior definitions (such as
the four they identified from Robinson, Witenberg, &
Samson, 2001). I also thank them personally for providing a philosophically sophisticated grounding and
context that I feel makes genuinely possible a popular
Christian imperative to ‘love the sinner, hate the sin’
that seems to have all but lost its meaning due perhaps
to overuse and misinterpretation. The distinction
Levinas (and the authors) make “between the humanity of a person—their most basic alterity—and the
abstract ideas and concepts that we hold about them”
appears to provide the philosophical (and phenomenological) space for such a possibility. And while I
may still take issue with some aspects of this popularized idiom and question its ability to fully answer the
complexities, clashes, and contexts of human diversity,
the new definition with its “valuing a person as more
important than any idea” appears to bridge my own
dissatisfaction and move the conversation from one
of deficit and abstraction to a much more fruitful one
concerning truth and tolerance (Oaks, 2011). It is my
hope that the questions and concerns I introduce here
serve only to stimulate further thought and dialogue
aimed at the implementation of the new definition of
tolerance within the applied context of psychotherapy.

A professional ethic.

The authors spoke at length about responsibility to
the other and its implications for their definition of
tolerance. “Even though we can never see the complete picture of a person, we still can answer that
call to be responsible for them” (emphasis added).
This foundational idea of responsibility to the other seems particularly applicable and significant in
the context of the therapist-to-client relationship
in psychotherapy. However, does and should this
same responsibility to the other exist in the reverse
direction, client-to-therapist? Given my suspicion
that this responsibility to other in the philosophy
of Levinas is likely ontological in human nature, my
question is: how should it be addressed and managed
in the psychotherapeutic context?
As a profession, therapists need to be set apart from
clients in some important ways. Even the most collaborative approaches to therapy in which the therapist is
seen more as a fellow-traveler than an expert, the therapist is still different from the client, and needs to remain so for the practice of psychotherapy to exist as a
discipline with a set of professional ethics. A bi-directional relationship in which the client is “responsible
for” the therapist in the same ways that the therapist
is “responsible for” the client appears to be ethically
problematic. Would not such an arrangement be more
akin to a new and reciprocal therapy with the client
occasionally assuming the role of the therapist’s therapist? Perhaps if the responsibility to other the client
feels and enacts toward the therapist is a felt moral obligation that inspires them to take seriously the aims
and messages of his/her therapist, such would not be
inescapably problematic. However, if the client’s responsibility to other inclines him/her to take care of
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